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By applying tournament analysis to the UK Unit Trusts data, the results
support significant risk shifting in the family tournament; i.e. interim winning
managers  tend  to  increase  their  level  of  risk  exposure  more  than  losing
managers. It also shows that the risk-adjusted returns of the winners outperform
those of the losers following the risk taking, which implies that risk altering can
be  regarded  as  an  indication  of  managers’  superior  ability.  However,  the
tournament behaviour can still be a costly strategy for investors, since winners
can be seen to beat losers in the observed returns due to the deterioration in the
performance of their major portfolio holdings. (JEL: G20, G23)
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I.  Introduction
Most mutual funds belong to a fund family. Several previous studies
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examine  the  characteristics  of  these  fund  families.  Guedj  and
Papastaikoudi (2003), and Massa (2003) analyse how performance of
the individual fund can be affected by its affiliated family. Nanda et al.
(2004) discuss the close relation between the growth of cash inflows of
a certain fund and the superior performance of other peer funds within
the same family. Gaspar et al. (2006) study how a fund family allocates
resources to promote the funds which have the potential to improve the
profits of the entire fund family. However, previous research devotes
little attention to the relation between the behaviour of individual funds
and other peer funds within the same family. Kempf and Ruenzi (2008)
(KR hereafter) are the first to examine such a connection. They consider
the fund tournament phenomenon in the fund family, first reported in
Brown et al. (1996). Despite their findings of differential levels of risk
exposure for winners and losers, it remains debatable whether the risk
taking behaviour stimulated by the fund tournament benefits the fund
performance  and  the  overall  profits  of  the  fund  family.  One  also
wonders whether the risk taking behaviour is a consequence of the
agency problem, or just an indication of managers’ inferior ability.
Mutual funds alter their risk exposure frequently for various reasons.
Chevalier and Ellison (1997) and Sirri and Tufano (1998) find a convex
relation between the funds’ previous performance and changes of their
cash inflows. Underperforming funds may therefore take more risks to
bet on better performance given the disproportionate response from cash
flows to previous fund performance. Underperforming funds may also
alter the level of portfolio risk before the reporting date to manipulate
their performance record Goetzmann et al., 2007; Lakonishok et al.,
1991), or to  conduct asset allocation strategies to promote certain
investment style (Faff et al., 2012).  On the other hand, funds may use
risk shifting to indicate active trading or superior stock selection ability,
which may not necessarily indent investors’ benefits Kacperczyk et al.
(2005). Managers are also compelled to work for the interest of the
whole family. In the context of a fund family, funds gain resources and
information advantages from the family by winning the competition.
Also, it is the fund family that decides which managers are to be
promoted or demoted based on the tournament outcome. As a result,
managers should change their risk exposure only to improve the fund
performance, rather than increase the overall uncertainty of the family.
However, to date there has been little research on the relation between
risk altering and performance shifting.  
This research is the first to discuss performance shifting in relation
to the risk taking in the family tournament. Using data from the UK unit45 Fund Family Tournament and Performance Consequences
trust  industry,  the  results  show  that  funds  with  better  previous
performance actively participate in the family tournaments by increasing
their risk exposure in the second half of the calendar year, while the
opposite is true in the segment tournament. The results persist when
funds  are  ranked  by  risk-adjusted  performance.  This  paper  also
documents a positive relation between family ranks and future risk
taking in bear market condition. Namely, mid-year winners increase
their risk level higher than the losers since the losing managers are
concerned  more  about  their  jobs.  The  performance  consequences
conducted in this research show that the interim winners can outperform
the losing ones in risk adjusted returns by taking more risk, whereas the
opposite is true when turning to the observed returns. The decreasing
observed returns in the winning group is probably due to the return
deteriorations from increased holdings of high beta stocks. 
This research fill the gap of literature on UK fund family tournament
as well as the empirical analysis on the performance consequences to
the tournament behaviour.  It is argued that interim winners might value
the importance of employment concerns and family favouritism more
seriously than the losers, which might urge their risk increasing to
secure the leading position, and also they aim to signal the fund family
of their superior ability with high fund alphas in order to gain more
resource from the family.
While the findings about the family tournament differ than those in
KR,  they  are  consistent  with  those  of  Mas-Colell  et  al.  (1995).
Specifically, the winning funds in a small fund group are more likely to
engage in a tournament with strategic interactions. The cut-off points by
KR to identify large and small families in the US fund industry are 16,
21, 31 and 36 funds, whereas in the UK the average family size is 4, and
the largest family consists of only 11 funds. Thus, the entire sample of
fund families can be classified as small families in the KR sense.
Second, the results confirm the effects of employment concerns in
relation to fund risk taking. Extant research suggests that, despite the
compensation schemes that are based on asset values, fund managers are
also exposed to employment risk, as they need to keep their jobs. Taking
more risk provides a means for the losing managers to bet on better
performance, though it may also raise the probability of performing
even worse. Relative to the losing managers, the interim winners are
under  less  employment  pressure.  Therefore,  the  underperforming
managers tend to take less risk than good performers (Chevalier and
Ellison, 1997; Kempf et al. 2009). Third, and most important, theMultinational Finance Journal 46
analysis of performance consequences shows that risk taking can serve
as an indication of managers’ superior stock selection ability. It also acts
as a crucial criterion for the fund family to decide which fund should be
advertised or favoured with extra resources. Thus, it stands to reason
that winner funds would actively consider shifting risk exposure to
retain their leading positions. The current research unearths significant
empirical evidence of changes in the risk taking behaviour in the family
tournaments. The results also support the conclusion that risk taking
helps top performing managers win the competition. 
This paper is organized as follows. The next section summarizes the
related literature. Section III describes the empirical methods to be
implemented in this research, while section IV discusses the data and
presents the descriptive statistics of the datasets. Section V reports the
empirical findings from the tournament analysis, and the performance
consequences due to tournament related risk taking. The results are then
summarized in the final section.
II.  Related literature
This research relates to three strands of literature. First, it revisits the
tournament phenomenon presented by many fund tournament studies.
Brown et al. (1996) (BHS hereafter) are among the first to document the
evidence that managers from half-year-losing funds have incentives to
alter  their  risk  exposure  more  significantly  than  those  from  the
half-year-winning funds. They report that half-year losers are more
likely to increase their exposure to portfolio risk for the second half of
the calendar year in an attempt to improve their future position against
peer funds, while half-year winners tend to decrease risk exposure to
retain their leading position. The motivation behind such tournament
behaviour can be explained by the disproportionate amount of capital
injected into top performing funds relative to the underperforming funds
(Chevalier and Ellison, 1997; Sirri and Tufano, 1998). Using monthly
data  and  contingent  tables,  Jans  and  Otten  (2008)  find  significant
evidence that mid-year losers increase risk exposure more than mid-year
winners in the first sub period, 1989–1996, of their sample using the UK
unit trust data. But the risk shifting behaviour reverses in the rest of
their sample period, 1997–2003, as they argue that a strategic game is
conducted by both the winners and the losers; i.e., both parties might
alter their risk shifting based on the decision made by the opposite47 Fund Family Tournament and Performance Consequences
parties. In recent research, Kempf et al. (2009) and Schwarz (2011)
apply the portfolio holding data in the tournament analysis. They argue
that, compared with estimating the realized risk, deploying the portfolio
holding  data  to  estimate  volatility  better  represents  the  managers’
intention to alter the exposure to portfolio risk. However, holding data
might not be sufficient to address managers’ frequent risk shifting, since
funds might only publish their holding data on a quarterly basis or even
on a half-year basis.
The second strand of literature relevant to this research is the fund
family  literature.  Fund  families  play  an  important  role  in  funds
operation. Since individual funds are usually affiliated to different fund
complexes, it is the fund family that decides managers’ promotion or
demotion,  and  which  funds  to  market  (Jain  and  Wu,  2000).  Fund
companies also conduct various types of strategies to enhance the
performance  of  certain  funds,  such  as  undertaking  cross-fund
subsidization to promote funds with high past performance through
allocating new IPO shares (Gaspar et al., 2006).  On the other hand,
fund companies also have the motivation to support family tournament.
Nanda et al. (2004) suggest that the growing cash inflows attracted by
families with star funds can bring new capital not only to the star funds,
but to other funds within the same family, i.e. the spillover effect. They
also find evidence that star families tend to increase the volatility of
cross-sectional returns in order to increase the odds of creating star
funds. In other words, risk taking in family tournament is a reasonable
strategy, from which a fund company can benefit greatly. 
The third strand of literature to which this research is related is the
growing field of funds’ risk taking. There are a large number of studies
discussing the purposes of funds’ risk shifting. Most of the studies
identify that risk shifting is a major channel for the managers to promote
cash inflows (See Chevalier and Ellison, 1997; Sirri and Tufano, 1998).
Huang  et  al  (2011)  (HSZ  hereafter)  initiate  the  discussion  on  the
performance consequences of risk shifting. Using portfolio holding data
of the US mutual fund industry, they find that funds with stable risk
levels provide better performance than funds significantly altering their
risk levels.  As it is costly for the fund investors to bear the loss of funds
during  risk  shifting,  they  argue  that  such  behaviour  is  merely  an
indication of inferior ability or due to compensation concerns. However,
despite a large number of studies examining the tournament behaviour
and the risk shifting in the fund industry, few studies have followed the
HSZ  model  to  conduct  a  complete  analysis  of  the  performanceMultinational Finance Journal 48
consequences of family tournament. Our research is therefore set to fill
the gap from an empirical perspective.
III.  Methodology
To identify the risk taking behaviour in the family tournament, an
empirical model suggested by KR is adapted as follows:
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where Δσi,t is the difference of funds’ volatility between the ranking
period and the post-ranking period. Different measures are conducted
in  examining  the  volatility  shifting,  including  the  total  risk, t h e
systematic risk and idiosyncratic risk. Volatility difference of the entire
family is also calculated, to analyse whether tournament behaviour
might occur at the family level. A fund family’s overall risk level is
based on the value weighted returns of all funds within the same family.
Previous studies consider the tournament behaviour on an annual basis,
in which the ranking period lasts from 6 to 8 months (e.g. BHS; Jans
and Otten, 2008). KR consider only the 7-month ranking period. To
fully address the time frame issue of the tournament behaviour, our
investigation includes the cases with both the June 6-month ranking
period) and July 7-month ranking period) cut-off points, while also
considering  the  quarter-ranking  period  to  further  the  analysis  of
managers’ risk shifting strategy. In equation 1),   and   are the ,
FAM
it R ,
Seg
it R
family  rank  and  segment  rank,  respectively.  The  segment  rank  is
generated by arranging funds of the same segment in ascending order
according to their performance in the ranking period. All sampled funds
are classified into three segments according to the IMA category of
investment styles, i.e. UK All Companies, UK Equity Income and UK
Smaller Companies.
For measuring the performance, BHS and KR use funds’ raw returns
only, due to the fact that the raw returns are the major concern of
investors. Given the recent concern that the close connection between
risk and returns might bias the tournament analysis (Schwarz, 2012),
Jensen alphas is also considered as a measure of the risk-adjusted49 Fund Family Tournament and Performance Consequences
performance. In order to make ranks from different investment styles
comparable, we normalize the rank by using the function (Ri –1) / (Ni
–1), where Ri is the segment rank of fund i and  Ni  is the size of the
corresponding segment. The family rank is calculated by further ranking
the normalized segment rank from funds within the same family in
ascending  order.  Thus,  the  family  rank  measures  the  relative
performance of each member in the family. We also normalize the
family rank using the same method, with Ni being the siz e of the
corresponding family. Di (Ds) is the dummy variable that represents a
large  (small)  fund  family.  Two  criteria  is  therefore  considered t o
classify fund family into large and small, namely, the aggregate value
of the family and the family size. This is because some of the families
may have only a limited number of members, but each member has a
large size of underlying assets. The model also includes the funds’
volatility in the ranking period, σi,t–1 , and the median difference of
funds’ risk in each of the segments, Δσmed , to capture the exogenous
factors that lead to risk shifting.   
For  the  performance  consequences  of  family  tournament,  the
performance differences is applied to examine the performance shifting
of individual funds. An empirical model is then constructed to analyse
how performance changes from the family perspective can be explained
by changes in the risk taking behaviour. Given that funds participate in
the tournament to win the competition, it is the relative performance
rather than the absolute performance that matters to the managers. Thus,
link can be built with the risk taking behaviour to the rank changes of
a certain fund. With the spillover effect and disproportionate relation
between historical performance and cash inflows, fund families also
have incentives to take on higher risk exposure in family tournament.
The empirical model can be formulated as follows:
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post-ranking period.
1  A high   indicates that the funds within the ,
Family
it R
family experience a positive performance shift with a smaller cost of
funds being demoted.   measures the level of risk shifting in a , it R
 
certain family. A similar aggregate ranking ratio is generated for each
family according to the changes in the level of risk exposure of the
underlying funds.   and   measure the cross-sectional , ii
    i
 
differences in the total risk, systematic risk and idiosyncratic risk,
respectively. DStar is equal to 1(0), if the family that fund i is affiliated
to is a star (dog) family. A star family contains at least one fund ranked
in the top quartile of the segment star fund) in the ranking period, while
a dog family includes any bottom performing funds dog fund). DStar,Dog
denotes a family that has both star and dog funds in the ranking period.
Both star and dog families may have motivation to promote family
tournament; i.e. the dog family will seek to improve the performance of
its dog fund by betting on the market, while the star family tends to
retain the position of the star funds in its group. Further, fund families
also have the ability to promote the tournament behaviour by resource
reallocation, i.e. family favouritism and the spillover effect. Thus, by
sorting families into star and dog types, it is able to explore which types
of  families  are  more  likely  to  be  involved  in  the  tournament.
Additionally, we may discover how performance of the peer funds in a
star/dog family responds to the tournament behaviour.
IV.  Data
The funds’ raw data are obtained from Morningstar. We collect daily
total returns data for the UK unit trust industry during the period
between 2001 and 2010. The funds selected into the sample are all UK
domiciled, equity based unit trusts and OEICs.
2 We exclude funds
1. The family rank is worked out by first taking the difference in the segment rank of
each sampled fund between the ranking and post-ranking period. Then we further rank each
of the fund families using the aggregate ranking ratio. For example, if family i has three
funds, A, B and C, the differences in normalized segment rank for each fund are A=0.1, B=0
and C=-0.3. Here, A =0.1 means that fund A improves its ranking ratio by 0.1; fund C has
been demoted by 0.3 in the segment rank and fund B has no change in its rank. The aggregate
ranking ratio for family i thus equals to –0.3+0+0.1=-0.2. 
2. Unit trusts and OEIC s are both open-ended investments with different bid/ask
pricing, legal structures and up-front loads. However in practice, they can both be regarded
as mutual fund equivalents. 51 Fund Family Tournament and Performance Consequences
targeting fixed income securities and mixed investments; the index
linked funds are also taken out of the sample. The sampled funds belong
to 3 IMA sectors: UK All Companies, UK Equity Income and UK Small
Companies. We treat these 3 IMA sectors as the 3 largest segments in
our tournament analysis. With regard to fund families, this research
regards a fund family as being formed by the funds that are managed by
the same fund company. For each of the families, we only keep the
oldest fund in the same share class, since funds within the same share
class deliver similar rates of returns.
3
Table 1 reports the summary statistics for the sample funds in this
research.  It shows a rapid growth of the UK fund industry, although the
population of UK funds is still moderate in numbers compared to the
US fund industry. Both the number of funds and the number of fund
families increased dramatically in the sample period. There were only
159 UK domiciled equity funds in 2001, and this number had doubled
to 324 by 2010, particularly the year of 2010 also sees the significant
growth of funds within the UK all companies sector.  Columns 3 and 4
report the mean cross-sectional returns and standard deviations of the
sample funds.  In general, a weak association is recognized between
higher  levels  of  risk  and  higher  observed  returns  among  the  fund
population, but exceptions occur in 2001/2002 and 2007/2008, when the
market suffered from the dot-com bubble and the global financial crisis,
respectively.
Apart from the raw returns, Jensen alphas are also estimated as a
measure  of  the  funds’  risk-adjusted  performance.  Three  sets  of
benchmark returns are employed to proxy the excessive market returns
(MKT), the size effect (SMB), the book to market effect (HML) and the
momentum effect (UMD). We choose the FTSE All Shares index as the
basis for calculating market returns, and hence the MKT. Use of the
MKT factor is motivated by the conventional CAPM model. The HML
and  SMB  factors  are  adopted  following  the  Fama-French  3-factor
model,  and  computed  by  two  pairs  of  market  portfolios.  SMB  is
generated by taking the difference between the FTSE 100 index and the
FTSE small capital index; HML is calculated by taking the difference
between the MSCI UK Growth index and MSCI UK Value index
3. The oldest fund is normally the first fund established by the fund company in the
share class. Other peer funds within the same share class can be created individually or by
splitting from the oldest one, but they all share a management team and a similar portfolio
composition. Morningstar provides additional information indicating the oldest fund from the
same share class. Multinational Finance Journal 52
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suggested by Cuthbertson et al. (2008). Following the method presented
in French’s website, the UMD factor in the Carhart 4-factor model is
generated by extracting the returns of the 1-year low return portfolio
from the returns of the 1-year high return portfolio.
4
V.  Empirical results
A. Risk taking in the segment and family tournaments
Table 2 reports the regression results fitting by model (1). In general, it
shows  significant  evidence  of  funds  engaging  in  both  family  and
segment tournaments.  In column 2 of Panel A, when the half-year
ranking period is considered, the main indicator of family tournament, 
,  has  a  significant  and  positive  coefficient  on  the ,
Fam
it R
large-value-family  dummy,  although  no  significant  tournament
behaviour is found in small families. The segment tournament indicator, 
, has a significantly negative factor loading on either the large or ,
Seg
it R
the small family dummy variable. The positive coefficient on  ,
Fam V
it i R D 
indicates that top ranking funds in the large families take more risk than
bottom ranked ones, which is consistent with the theoretical prediction
of strategic tournament by Taylor (2003). This result is also consistent
when the cut-off point of the ranking period turns to be 7 months in the
second column of Panel A. 
The negative coefficient on   suggests a non-strategic segment ,
Seg
it R
tournament in which half-year underperforming funds are more likely
to increase their risk exposure in the second half of the year than are the
top performing ones. The risk shifting behaviour in segment tournament
is more sensitive in small families than in large ones by more than 50
basis points.
Our findings regarding the family tournament are contrary to those
reported in KR, which suggests that underperforming funds within a
small family increase risk more than over-performing ones. Our results
however do indicate that managers of the mid-year winners choose to
increase their risk exposure than the mid-year losers. This is particularly
true for those from the large sized families, since large sized funds have
more capital to fund strategy shifting or are the market makers that
4. The detailed method of calculating the moment factor can be found in French’s
website, http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html. 55 Fund Family Tournament and Performance Consequences
enjoy some competitive edge over the small funds. 
Chevalier and Ellison (1997) argue that top performing managers
may increase their risk level to retain their leading positions. In the
segment tournament, mid-year winners are less motivated to compete
with peer funds within the same segments, as the only reward for the
winner is the new cash inflows. Existing research however shows no
supportive evidence of performance improvement over the peer losers
TABLE 2. Family and segment tournaments  
A.
(6, 6) (7, 5) (Q1,Q2) (Q2,Q3) (Q3,Q4) 
0.0050** 0.0049** 0.0040** 0.0045** 0.0065**  ,
Fam V
it I R D 
0.0033 0.0018*** 0.0020 –0.0019 0.0040 ,
Fam V
it s R D 
–0.0076*** –0.0068*** 0.0037 –0.0104*** –0.0076**  ,
Seg V
it I R D 
–0.0127*** –0.0074*** 0.00002 –0.0091*** –0.0111***  ,
Seg V
it s R D 
 σi,t  – 1 –3.5697*** –2.9213*** –4.8218*** –4.0134*** –3.6620*** 
 Δσmed 13.6588*** 12.9068*** 7.0209*** 14.3347*** 11.8634*** 
 R
2 88.35% 89.12% 74.18% 86.61% 83.15% 
B.
(6, 6) (7, 5) (Q1,Q2) (Q2,Q3) (Q3,Q4)
0.0054** 0.0034 0.0076*** 0.0031 0.0067** ,
Fam S
it I R D 
0.0028 0.0033 0.0023 0.0003 0.0041 ,
Fam S
it s R D 
–0.0105*** –0.0061** –0.0007 –0.0091*** –0.0097*** ,
Seg S
it I R D 
–0.0115*** –0.0098*** 0.0036 –0.0111*** –0.0095*** ,
Seg S
it s R D 
 σi,t – 1 –3.5662**** –2.9171*** –4.8229*** –4.0229*** –3.6757*** 
 Δσmed 13.6754*** 12.9184*** 7.0462*** 14.3398*** 11.8655*** 
 R
2 88.34% 89.13% 74.23% 86.58% 83.12%
Note:  This table presents the regression results from the family tournament model (1). 
and   are the family and segment ranks based on the funds’ daily total returns, ,
Fam
it R ,
Seg
it R
respectively.  D1 ( Ds) is the dummy variable which equals to 1(0) when fund i belongs to a
large (small) fund family. σi,t –1 indicates the risk level that fund i is exposed to in the ranking
period and Δσmed is the median difference of the segment volatility. Funds’ daily returns from
3 UK IMA segments, i.e. UK All Companies, UK Equity Income and UK Small Companies,
are examined for the sample years between 2001 and 2010. Panel A reports the results when
fund families are sorted by funds’ aggregate market size, while in Panel B results are sorted
by the number of funds in a family.  Column 1 presents the results when 6 months is taken
as the ranking period and column 2 shows the results when the ranking period is 7 months and
post-ranking period is 5 months. Columns 4–6 report the results when a quarterly tournament
is considered. All the results are based on a time fixed panel regression. ***, ** and * indicate
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.Multinational Finance Journal 56
after the risk shifting, implying that it actually becomes even harder to
attract new cash inflows by increasing risk exposure see for example
(HSZ). 
Mid-year winners are highly motivated in the family tournament
since  the winner of the tournament may be rewarded by the fund
company through various forms of family favouritism. Even those
mid-year winners who have already been rewarded by the family may
seek for continuation of such favouritism (Guedj and Papstaikoudi,
2003; Nanda et al., 2004 and Gaspar et al., 2006). Large sized families
may also encourage their member funds, particularly the winning ones,
to participate in the tournament, since the winner funds could spare their
new capital to benefit the other peer funds in the family. Compared with
large sized families, smaller ones have no competitive edge in shifting
investment strategies. Columns 4–6 of Panel A in table 2 report the
outcome of the research that is extended to include the tournament
analysis on  a  quarterly basis. The family tournament behaviour is
consistently significant throughout the quarterly analysis, while segment
tournament behaviour disappears between the first and second quarter. 
In Panel B of table 2, the fund families are classified into large or
small according to the number of their underlying family members. The
results in general agree with those given in Panel A. Funds in small
sized families  are not actively involved in family tournament. An
additional reason for this could be that funds in the families with fewer
members are normally managed by the same manager or have a similar
portfolio composition, which leads them to be even less motivated to
engage in a family tournament. 
The results from the segment tournament given by table 2 present a
negative relation between the segment ranking and risk shifting, that is,
loses increase their second half-year risk more than the winners. Since
each of the segment contain a large group of funds, we expect the
existence of non-strategic interaction in the tournament which is showed
by  Taylor  (2003)  that  winners  take  no  consideration  of  losers’
strategies. Hence, our results are also consistent with the findings given
by BHS, Koski and Pontiff (1999) and Elton et al. (2003).  
To  further  analyse  family  tournaments  we  re-rank  the  funds
according to their risk-adjusted returns in the ranking period, since the
previous  literature suggests that a close relation between risk a n d
returns could jeopardize the tournament analysis. The risk-adjusted
returns can be estimated by using the Carhart 4 factor model.
Table 3 reports the results from model (1) based on using the Jensen57 Fund Family Tournament and Performance Consequences
alpha from the Carhart 4 factor model as the ranking criterion. Similar
tournament  behaviour  is  found  in  the  large  sized  families,  where
 is found to have a significant and positive loading.  Its ,
Fam V
it i R D 
p a r a m e t e r  v a l u e  a s  s h o w n  i n  t a b l e  3  i s  v e r y  c l o s e  t o  t h a t  o f  t h e
coefficients  on    in  Panel  A  of  table  2,  with  only  an ,
Fam V
it i R D 
8-basis-point difference. Funds within small sized families are not found
to increase their risk exposure significantly. Therefore, our analysis
TABLE 3. Family and segment tournaments (4 Factor Model Alpha)
A.
(6, 6) (7, 5) (Q1,Q2) (Q2,Q3) (Q3,Q4) 
0.0058** 0.0049** 0.0029 0.004* 0.0037  ,
Fam V
it I R D 
0.0022 0.002 0.0053*** –0.0013 0.0048** ,
Fam V
it s R D 
0.0005 0.0028 –0.0017 0.0016 –0.0059** ,
Seg V
it I R D 
–0.002 0.0026 –0.0069*** –0.0011 –0.0091*** ,
Seg V
it s R D 
 σi,t  – 1  –3.5048*** –2.9170*** –4.8114*** –3.8839*** –3.6208***
 Δσmed 3.6334*** 12.8792*** 7.05774*** 14.2787*** 11.8891***
 R
2 88.32% 89.11% 74.22% 86.61% 83.28%
B.
(6, 6) (7, 5) (Q1,Q2) (Q2,Q3) (Q3,Q4)
0.0047** 0.0048** 0.0056** 0.0028 0.0056**  ,
Fam S
it I R D 
0.0034 0.0025 0.0028 –0.0001 0.0031 ,
Fam S
it s R D 
–0.0007 0.0026 –0.0053** 0.0002 –0.0073** ,
Seg S
it I R D 
–0.0027 0.0017 –0.0038 –0.0014 –0.0084***  ,
Seg S
it s R D 
 σi,t – 1 –3.5000*** –2.9157*** –4.8138*** –3.8892*** –3.6295***
 Δσmed 13.6676*** 12.8787*** 6.9834*** 14.3356*** 11.8775***
 R
2 88.32% 83.71% 74.06% 86.55% 83.24%
Note:  This table presents the regression results from the family tournament model (1). 
 and  are the family and segment ranks respectively based on funds’ alphas ,
Fam
it R ,
Seg
it R
estimated by the Carhart 4 factors model. D1(Ds) is the dummy variable which equals to 1(0)
when fund i belongs to a large (small) fund family. σi,t–1 is the risk level that fund i is exposed
to in the ranking period and Δσmed is the median difference of the segment volatility. Funds’
daily returns from 3 UK IMA segments, UK All Companies, UK Equity Income and UK
Small Companies, are examined for the sample years between 2001 and 2010. Panel A
reports the results when the fund families are sorted by funds’ aggregate market size, while
in Panel B results are sorted by the number of funds in the family. Column 1 presents the
results for the 6–month ranking period and column 2 shows the results when the ranking
period is 7 months and the post-ranking period is 5 months. Columns 4–6 report the results
when a quarterly tournament is considered. All the results are based on a time fixed panel
regression. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.Multinational Finance Journal 58
indicates a pervasive phenomenon of family tournament among large
sized fund families. However, evidence reported in table 3 does not
support the segment tournament in both large and small families, as
none of the coefficients on   are significantly different from 0. ,
Seg
it R
Employment concern is another incentive that can trigger managers’
risk altering. (Kempf et al. 2009) find that mangers change their risk
level  differently  during  distinct  market  condition.  They  argue that
mid-year winners increase their risk exposure more than the mid-year
losers in bear market since the losing managers are more concerned
about their jobs (employment incentive dominant). Opposite situation
occurs in bull market when compensation is the major concern among
the managers (compensation incentive dominant). To further test the
distinguishing risk shifting during these two types of market condition,
we apply the empirical model suggested by Kempf et al. (2009). The
model is described as following:
(3)
(1) (2)
,, , , Δ
Fam Com Fam Emp
it i i it i it it RD RD       
where  , the fund’s family rank,  is interacted with the dummy ,
Fam
it R
variable which classify the market condition into bear and bull.
5 Table
4 reports the results.
The results show significantly distinct risk shifting between the bear
and bull market. Mid-year winners are more likely to increase their risk
exposure than the mid-year losers when the employment incentive is
dominant  in  that  year,  whereas  the  opposite  is  true  when  the
compensation incentive is dominant in the sampled year. For example,
the coefficient is 6.79% for  and –4.92% for   ,
Fam Com
it RD  ,
Fam Emp
it RD 
when 6-month ranking period is considered. Also, it seemed that the
employment incentive is more sensitive with the risk shifting than the
compensation incentive given the coefficient of    is larger ,
Fam Emp
it RD 
in absolute value. Column 3 of table 4 reports similar results as those
shown in the previous column.
The findings in table 4 further confirm our concerns regarding to the
risk taking driven by employment incentive. Increasing risk exposure
also adds more uncertainties to the holding portfolio, which may lead to
5. We adopt the method suggested by Kempf et al. (2009) to classify the sampled years
into bear and bull ones. Thus, 2003, 2005, 2006, 2009 and 2010 is considered as bull years
(compensation incentive dominant) while the rest of the sampled years are in bear condition
(employment incentive dominant).59 Fund Family Tournament and Performance Consequences
even worse performance in the future. Since underperforming mangers
are under more employment pressures, they are more cautions with risk
taking than the over performing ones. Meanwhile, the higher sensitivity
between the risk shifting and employment concerns is also consistent
with our overall finding on the relation between risk taking and fund
previous performance in table 2, where interim winners tend to increase
their level of risk more than the loser for all sampled years.
The research extend the analysis to look at the tournament behaviour
on the family basis. Fund families are ranked according to their mean
value weighted returns in the ranking period and we create dummy
variables indicating a star (dog) family when it has at least one top
performing  (bottom  performing)  fund.  The  empirical  model  is
formulated as follows:
(1) (2) (3)
,, , Δ
Family Family V Family V
it i i it l i it s i S t a r RD RD D        
(4)
(4) (5) (6)
,  , 1 ,                            i Dog i Star Dog i i t i t DD       
where the risk shifting of the whole family is computed by taking the
difference of  volatility of families’ value weighted returns between the
ranking and post-ranking periods.
TABLE 4. Employment and compensation driven risk taking
Risk taking (6, 6) (7, 5) 
0.0679*** 0.0668*** ,
Fam Emp
it RD 
(4.24) (4.45)
–0.0492*** –0.0577*** ,
Fam Cam
it RD 
(–3.27) (–4.09) 
 R
2 61.11% 55.29%
  Note:  This table presents the regression results from the family tournament model (3). 
is the family ranks based on funds’ observed mean returns. D
Com (D
Emp ) is the dummy ,
Fam
it R
variable which equals to 1 when the sampled year is compensation (employment) incentive
dominant. We classify the market into bull (bear) when the mid-year return of the FTSE All
Share Index is positive (negative). Funds’ daily returns from 3 UK IMA segments, UK All
Companies, UK Equity Income and UK Small Companies, are examined for the sample years
between 2001 and 2010. Column 2 presents the results for the 6-month ranking period and
column 3 shows the results when the ranking period is 7 months and the post-ranking period
is 5 months. All the results are based on a time fixed panel regression. ***, ** and * indicate
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.Multinational Finance Journal 60
Table  5  reports  the  regression  results  from  model  (4).  The
coefficients  on    and    are  not  significant, ,
Family V
it i R D  ,
Family V
it s R D 
indicating that fund families do not participate in the tournament by
altering their overall risk level. Both tables 2 and 3 show a distinct
difference in risk taking behaviour between winners and losers within
the same family, which can offset the risk level taken by their affiliated
family. For the small families, those with fewer members are normally
TABLE 5. Whole family tournaments 
A.
(6, 6) (7, 5) (Q1,Q2) (Q2,Q3) (Q3,Q4) 
0.0004 –0.0005 –0.0005 0.0010 –0.0015*  ,
Fam V
it I R D 
0.0006 –0.0002 –0.0005 0.0009 –0.0012 ,
Fam V
it s R D 
 DStar 0.0013*** 0.0007 0.0011 0.0014** –0.0001
 DDog 0.0008 –0.0003 –0.0001 0.0014** –0.0003
 DStar,Dog 0.0019*** 0.0014*** 0.0004 0.0015** –0.0002
 σi,t–1 –15.497*** –15.0568*** –7.8053*** –13.5333*** –10.3831*** 
 R
2 77.44% 65.35% 49.01% 53.19% 26.75%
B.
(6, 6) (7, 5) (Q1,Q2) (Q2,Q3) (Q3,Q4)
0.0006 –0.0003 –0.0004 0.0013 –0.0011 ,
Fam S
it I R D 
0.0004 –0.0003 –0.0006 0.0007 –0.0016* ,
Fam S
it s R D 
 DStar 0.0013*** 0.0007 0.0011 0.0013* –0.0001
 DDog 0.0007 –0.0003 –0.0001 0.0013** –0.0004
 DStar,Dog 0.0018*** 0.0013** 0.0003 0.0013** –0.0003
 σi,t–1 –15.468*** –15.0265*** –7.7978*** –13.4907*** –10.3292***
 R
2 77.48% 65.34% 49.00% 53.30% 26.96% 
Note:  This table presents the regression results on risk shifting in the family tournament. 
is the rank of the family return, which is calculated by using the value weighted return ,
Fam
it R
of funds within the same family. D1 (Ds) is the dummy variable, which equals to 1(0) when
family   is a large (small) fund family. DStar (DDog) equals to 1(0) when family i is a star (dog)
family. σi,t –1 is the risk of family i in the ranking period. Funds’ daily returns from 3 UK
IMA segments, i.e. UK All Companies, UK Equity Income and UK Small Companies, are
examined for the sample years between 2001 and 2010. Panel A reports the results when fund
families are sorted by the funds’ aggregate market size, while in Panel B results are sorted by
the number of funds in the family.  Column 1 presents the results where 6 months is the
cut-off point for a ranking period and column 2 shows the results when the ranking period is
7 months and the post-ranking period is 5 months. Columns 4–6 report the results when a
quarterly tournament is considered. All the results are based on a time fixed panel regression.
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.61 Fund Family Tournament and Performance Consequences
under the management of the same team, and with similar investment
strategies  would  be  less  active  in  participating  in  tournament.
Furthermore, both DStar and DStar,Dog have significant coefficients in the
(6, 6) interval of Panel A, with 13 and 19 basis points, suggesting that
funds within the star families tend to take more risks. This is consistent
with the previous findings, in which top performing funds increase their
risks more than bottom performing ones. Particularly, since star families
contain funds ranked in the top 10% of the corresponding segment, the
results given in table 5 imply that the increase of the families’ overall
risk is mainly attributable to the risk shifting undertaken by the star
funds, while the other peer funds, especially the dog funds, maintain
stable risk levels. This finding can also be explained as the direct
consequence of family subsidization, since fund companies keep star
funds informed with more valuable information in order to utilize the
spillover effect.
B. Risk characteristics in segment and family tournaments
The  paper  now  extend  the  investigation  to  deploy  alternative  risk
measures in analysing the tournament behaviour. Tables 6 and 7 report
results when the market beta and the idiosyncratic risk are used to
compute the level of risk shifting. 
In tables 6 and 7, the statistical significance of coefficients on
 in both the (6, 6) and (7, 5) intervals of Panel A suggests ,
Fam V
it i R D 
that leading managers of the family increase more of their systematic
risk in the tournament than do the losing ones. This result is further
enhanced in Panel B when families are sorted according to the number
of their underlying funds, i.e. with a parameter value of 6.23% and
7.88% respectively for the (6, 6) and (7, 5) intervals. The possible
reason lies behind might be due to mangers’ increasing holding of the
high beta stocks. The performance attribution analysis conducted in
Section V, part D, also support that the increasing of market beta
contribute to winners’ outperformance against the losers in the family
tournament. While cross subsidization can bring more resources to
finance  major  strategy  changes  by  the  winning  funds,  it  seems
reasonable for the winning funds to decrease uncertainty resulting from
holding small value equities, since previous evidence suggests that in
general the index-linked funds outperform the actively managed funds.
The results in Panels A and B of table 7 also confirm this finding by
showing no statistically significant evidence of family tournament whenMultinational Finance Journal 62
the idiosyncratic risk is considered.
Compared with family tournaments, in table 6 no evidence is found
to support the shifts in risk taking behaviour in terms of systematic risk
in the segment tournament. However, the losing funds are found to
increase their idiosyncratic risk exposure more than the winning funds
in the second half of the calendar year, as shown in table 6 where
 has a coefficient of –6.1% in Panel A and –8.4% in Panel B. ,
Seg
it i R D 
TABLE 6. Family and segment tournaments (Market Beta)
A.
(6, 6) (7, 5) (Q1,Q2) (Q2,Q3) (Q3,Q4) 
0.0363* 0.0497*** 0.0484*** 0.0180 0.0408***  ,
Fam V
it I R D 
0.0209 0.0448** 0.0156 –0.0049 0.0572*** ,
Fam V
it s R D 
–0.0137 –0.0035 –0.0524*** 0.0470** –0.0193  ,
Seg V
it I R D 
–0.0471** –0.0303 –0.0455** 0.0113 –0.0578***  ,
Seg V
it s R D 
 βi,t  – 1 –2.3525*** –3.4309*** –0.2903*** –0.1070*** –0.3457*** 
 Δβmed 12.3390*** 11.8658*** 0.5272*** 0.8219*** 0.4662*** 
 R
2 44.12% 38.27% 65.64% 41.17% 59.19% 
B.
(6, 6) (7, 5) (Q1,Q2) (Q2,Q3) (Q3,Q4)
0.0623*** 0.0788*** 0.0781*** 0.0338** 0.0782*** ,
Fam S
it I R D 
–0.00236 0.0202 –0.0051 –0.0183 0.0243* ,
Fam S
it s R D 
–0.0569** –0.0396* –0.0909*** 0.0127 –0.0704*** ,
Seg S
it I R D 
–0.0136 0.0051 –0.0159 0.0381** –0.0053 ,
Seg S
it s R D 
 βi,t – 1 –2.3124*** –3.4064*** –0.2902*** –0.1031*** –0.3456*** 
 Δβmed 12.3586*** 11.8913*** 0.5345*** 0.8244*** 0.4699*** 
 R
2 44.25% 38.31% 65.88% 41.01% 59.08%
Note:  This table presents the regression results from model (1) where Δσi,t is given by
the difference of the market beta between the ranking and post-ranking periods. The market
beta is estimated by the Carhart 4 factors model.   and   are the family and segment ,
Fam
it R ,
Seg
it R
ranks based on funds’ daily returns. Dι (Ds) is the dummy variable which equals to 1(0) when
fund i belongs to a large (small) fund family. βi,t –1 is the market beta of fund i in the ranking
period and Δβmed is the median difference of the segment beta. Funds’ daily returns in the
sample period of 2001 to 2010 from 3 UK IMA segments, i.e. UK All Companies, UK Equity
Income and UK Small Companies, are used to estimate the market beta. Panel A reports the
results when fund families are sorted by funds’ aggregate market size, while in Panel B
results are sorted by the number of funds in the family.  Column 1 presents the results where
6 months is taken as the cut-off point for the ranking period and column 2 shows the results
when the ranking period is 7 months and the post-ranking period is 5 months. Columns 4–6
report the results when a quarterly tournament is considered. All the results are based on a
time fixed panel regression. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.63 Fund Family Tournament and Performance Consequences
This result remains significant in the small family case. HSZ find
similar results in their research. They hold that underperforming funds
tend  to  take  more  idiosyncratic  risks  by  increasing  portfolio
concentration or changing stock selection. But such an effort brings no
positive feedback to performance consequences. Similar arguments can
be found in Ang et al. (2006), for example. Given disproportionate
TABLE 7. Family and segment tournaments (Idiosyncratic Risk)
A.
(6, 6) (7, 5) (Q1,Q2) (Q2,Q3) (Q3,Q4) 
0.0035 0.0026 –0.0004 0.0036 0.0035  ,
Fam V
it I R D 
0.0024 0.0012 0.0004 0.0007 0.0050** ,
Fam V
it s R D 
–0.0061*** –0.0036 0.0031 –0.0054** –0.0075**  ,
Seg V
it I R D 
–0.0089*** –0.0051** 0.0004 –0.0050** –0.0075***  ,
Seg V
it s R D 
 σεi,t  – 1 –3.5591*** –3.1808 –4.5610*** –3.9013*** –3.6651*** 
 Δσεmed 12.5259*** 11.5825 5.1820*** 13.7519*** 10.4571*** 
 R
2 78.89% 79.10% 40.31% 72.76% 73.44% 
B.
(6, 6) (7, 5) (Q1,Q2) (Q2,Q3) (Q3,Q4)
0.0036 0.0003 0.0008 0.0019 0.0035 ,
Fam S
it I R D 
0.0022 0.0031 –0.006 0.0022 0.0049** ,
Fam S
it s R D 
–0.0084*** –0.0028 0.0015 –0.0051** –0.0049* ,
Seg S
it I R D 
–0.0072*** –0.0067** 0.0012 –0.0053** –0.0095*** ,
Seg S
it s R D 
 σεi,t – 1 –3.5715*** –3.1907*** –4.5775*** –3.9056*** –3.6625*** 
 Δσεmed 12.5394*** 11.6465*** 5.1838*** 13.7525*** 10.4791*** 
 R
2 78.86% 79.12% 40.24% 72.74% 73.48%
Note:  This table presents the regression results from model (1) where Δσi,t is given by
the  difference  of  the  market  beta  between  the  ranking  and  post-ranking  periods.  The
idiosyncratic risk is proxied by the standard deviation of the error term from the Carhart 4
factors model.   and   are the family and segment ranks based on funds’ daily ,
Fam
it R ,
Seg
it R
returns. Dlarge(Dsmall) is the dummy variable which equals to 1(0) when fund i belongs to a
large (small) fund family.  –1 is the market beta of fund i in the ranking period and
2
, it  
 is the median difference of the segment beta. Funds’ daily returns in the sample period
2
med   
of 2001 to 2010 from 3 UK IMA segments, i.e. UK All Companies, UK Equity Income and
UK Small Companies, are used to estimate the market beta. Panel A reports the results when
fund families are sorted by funds’ aggregate market size, while in Panel B results are sorted
by the number of funds in the family.  Column 1 presents the results when the cut-off point
for the ranking period is 6 months, and column 2 shows the results when the ranking period
is 7 months and the post-ranking period is 5 months. Columns 4–6 report the results when a
quarterly tournament is present. All the results are based on a time fixed panel regression.
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responses of the growing cash inflows, it comes as no surprise to see
that  losing  funds  choose  to  increase  their  exposure  to  uncertainty
surrounding their portfolio with a view to improving performance in the
segment tournament.
C. Performance comparison in family tournaments
Despite the evidence of top funds’ performance persistence after risk
shifting, it remains to be seen whether such funds can outperform their
peers in the same family. To answer this question, in this section we
compare the performance between the mid-year winners and losers
under different levels of risk shifting. The results are reported in tables
8.
In the first column of table 8, we sort funds into 5 groups RS group
according to their levels of risk shifting. The funds are then classified
into  the  winner  and  loser  groups  according  to  their  mid-year
performance. Performance of the funds is measured by the mean returns,
the CAPM alphas, the 3-factor alphas and the 4-factor alphas. In Panel
A where the funds’ segment ranks are used to sort winner/loser groups,
the results suggest that the losing funds cannot outperform the winning
ones for all evaluation measures when their risk taking is at a low level.
The mean returns from the winning group exceed those of the losing
group by 3.74%, statistically significant at the 1% level. Similar results
can be drawn when the Jensen alpha measure is used. However, the
winning funds cannot beat the losing ones when they take more risk,
since the performance differences between the two groups are not
statistically significant for the 5
th RS group. Recalling the results in
table 2, where the mid-year losers tend to increase their risk exposure
more  than  the  winners  in  segment  tournaments,  the  performance
consequences of funds’ risk shifting, however, suggest that it does not
make sense for the losing funds to take extra risks. Therefore, winner’s
risk increasing cannot but be an indication of inferior ability or a sign
of the agency problem (See similar argument in HSZ).
In Panel B of table 8, family ranks are used to sort funds into
winning  and  losing  groups.  Similar  results  are  documented,  that
mid-year winners outperform the losers in the 1
st RS group. However,
at a higher level of risk shifting, table 8 shows a mixed result between
performance  measures  based  on  raw  returns  and  Jensen  alphas.
Specifically, mid-year losers can beat the winners in terms of observed
returns, but underperform them in Jensen alpha. The difference is65 Fund Family Tournament and Performance Consequences
–5.34% in returns and 3.59% in CAPM alpha; both are significant at the
1% level. Such differences become smaller when the 3-factor and
4-factor  alphas  are  considered,  but  remain  statistically  significant.
Certainly, winners’ underperformance could be due to mean reversion
in their main holdings’ returns. In table 6, the results have already
shown that increasing portfolios’ market beta can be a channel of risk
shifting. Fund managers may deliberately select large-cap equities with
good past performance, or keep the position of their original holdings
to maintain their leading positions. But those equities might not perform
persistently, which can lower the overall returns of the winners. 
On the other hand, the higher value of Jensen alphas delivered by the
mid-year winners implies that those managers possess superior stock
selection abilities so that they are able to re-construct their portfolios by
picking  up  more  underpriced  stocks.  Meanwhile,  judging  by  the
increasing magnitude of alphas obtained from the 3-factor model and
the 4-factor model, it is plausible that managers’ superior ability is not
attributable  to  increased  holdings  of  the  size  and  book  to  market
portfolio, or the momentum portfolio. 
In addition, Panel B shows that the mid-year losers tend to keep their
risk at a stable level to mimic the performance of the winners, which
may explain why the performance differences between the winner and
loser groups are the smallest. HSZ find the similar result that funds with
more stable risk levels exhibit the best performance. In a strategic
tournament, mid-year winners show risk taking behaviour similar to that
of the mid-year losers, since the winning funds now have more access
to  new  capital  to  manipulate  their  portfolios.  The  performance
improvement in terms of the Jensen alphas following changes in the risk
taking indicates the superior stock selection ability of the winning
managers. But when the magnitude of the risk shifting decreases, the
winners lose their competitive edge; hence both winners and losers
reduce to adopt a similar investment strategy, and so no performance
consequence is shown here. However, in the 1
st RS group, where the
risk shifting is limited in magnitude or even changes to take on less
rather than more risk exposure, mid-year losers still cannot outperform
the winners, for the reason that the winners can liquidate some of their
holdings to lock on the cash profits (See for example HSZ).
6
6. We also extend our performance consequences analysis to consider a 7–5 interval
segment/family tournament, and similar results are therefore documented. Hence we omit the
detailed results but can provide them on request. Multinational Finance Journal 66
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To provide further insights into winning managers’ trading strategies
in the tournament table 9 undertake a performance attribution analysis
which compare the loadings of each pricing factors (betas) on the
half-year basis. In Panel A where funds from the sector of All UK
Companies are considered, the results suggest that betas of the market
and size portfolio from both the winning and losing funds increase
significantly with their risk exposure in the second half of the year while
opposite  results  are  found  on  the  betas  of  book  to  market  and
momentum portfolio. Similar results on the market and size portfolio are
found when conducting the analysis on the funds from the UK income
sector, but no significant trading pattern on the market and size portfolio
is  documented  in  the  high  RS  group.  In  terms  of  the  comparison
between the winning and losing funds, for funds within the all company
and income sectors, we find evidence that by increasing their half-year
risk winners have significant higher beta on the size and book to market
portfolio  than  the  losers  when  engaging  in  family  tournament.
Particularly, the winners have a beta exceeding those of the losers by
0.144 on average on the size portfolio in the top RS group, and the gap
remains at 0.041 on the book to market portfolio and it is statistically
significant.  No  evidence  is  found  to  support  that  the  momentum
portfolio contribute positively when winners increase their half-year risk
in the family tournament. Such a results is consistent with the findings
by Cuthbertson et al. (2008) where momentum factors are generally not
significant at the individual fund level.
The research extends its investigation to examine the size effect in
the performance consequences to the risk shifting. Our results suggest
a consistent outperforming on the alphas delivered by the funds who
largely increase their risk exposure in the family tournament. In table
10, funds are further classified into 5 groups according to their size. In
Panel A where segment tournament is considered the findings agree
with  the  previous  results  in  which  winners  in  the  low  RS  group
outperform the losers, particular for the group of small funds. But no
significant pattern is documented on comparing winning/losing funds
when turning to higher RS group. Panel B reports the analysis based on
the family tournament, the results suggest that large funds in the winner
group are more likely to outperform the losing ones with the similar size
scale by increasing their second half-year risk exposure. However,
significant performance difference is documented between the winning
and losing funds in the small size group when fund managers retain or
decrease their second half-year risk level. Such results persistentMultinational Finance Journal 72
TABLE 10. Post fund ranking size adjusted performance 
 A.
Raw returns CAPM alphas FF alphas Carhart alphas
RS Size W–L W–L W–L W–L
1 1 –0.0132 0.0573*** 0.0637*** 0.0692*** 
(–0.43) (2.39) (4.78) (4.99)
2 0.0096 0.0106 0.0556*** 0.0450*** 
(0.29) (0.43) (2.70) (3.27)
3 0.0088 0.0325* 0.0157 0.0227*
(0.31) (1.50) (0.06) (1.55)
4 –0.0050 0.0343* 0.0150* 0.0100
(–0.15) (1.41) (1.36) (0.97)
5 0.0662*** –0.0072 0.0213* 0.0150
(2.23) (–0.37) (1.63) (1.01)
2 1 –0.0067 0.0057 0.0260** 0.0127
(–0.21) (0.26) (2.05) (0.92)
2 0.0016 –0.0028 0.0291* 0.0293***
(0.05) (–0.13) (0.54) (2.37)
3 0.0458* 0.0407** 0.0251** 0.0250**
(1.45) (1.84) (2.00) (1.90)
4 –0.0076 0.0249* 0.0188* 0.0091
(–0.26) (1.39) (1.55) (0.70)
5 –0.0045 0.0432***  0.0300*** 0.0270**
(–0.15) (2.23) (2.61) (2.26)
3 1 0.0004 –0.0136 0.0174* 0.0046
(0.01) (–0.65) (1.44) (0.36)
2 0.0126 0.0568*** 0.0447*** 0.0525***
(0.38) (2.36) (3.32) (3.69)
3 0.0256 0.0393** 0.0548*** 0.0565***
(0.76) (1.85) (3.91) (3.91)
4 –0.0092 0.0300* 0.0192* 0.0248**
(–0.30) (1.39) (1.41) (1.76)
5 –0.0232 0.0123 0.0152* 0.0075
(–0.87) (0.86) (1.32) (0.60)
4 1 0.0499 0.0701** 0.0729*** 0.0500**
(1.22) (2.26) (3.17) (2.01)
2 0.0344 0.0238 0.0129 –0.0003
(1.09) (1.15) (0.83) (–0.01)
3 –0.0082 0.0477 0.0366* 0.0013
(–0.27) (1.11) (1.86) (0.14)
4 –0.0279 –0.0052 0.0140 0.0157
(–0.98) (–0.29) (1.06) (1.13)
5 –0.0029 0.0030 0.0213** 0.0182*
(–0.10) (0.19) (2.07) (1.62)
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TABLE 10. (Continued)
A.
Raw returns CAPM alphas FF alphas Carhart alphas 
RS Size  W–L W–L W–L W–L
5 1 0.0432* 0.0011 0.0141 0.0077 
(1.37) (0.67) (1.10) (1.00)
2 0.0558** 0.0096 0.0048 0.0121*
(1.62) (0.40) (0.16) (0.62)
3 0.0091 0.0018 0.0029 –0.0027 
(0.26) (0.08) (0.25) (–0.18)
4 –0.0347 0.0130 0.0157 0.0053
(–1.13) (0.69) (0.35) (0.70)
5 –0.0484** 0.0060 0.0102 0.0101
(–1.73) (0.76) (0.04) (0.51)
B.
  Raw returns CAPM alphas FF alphas Carhart alphas
RS Size  W–L W–L W–L W–L
1 1 –0.0320 0.0506*** 0.0489** 0.0304***
(–1.16) (2.53) (2.19) (2.30)
2 –0.0040 0.0319* 0.0263*** 0.0308***
(–0.16) (1.63) (2.50) (2.65)
3 0.0723*** 0.0025 0.0126 0.0267***
(2.89) (0.74) (0.17) (2.14)
4 0.0165 0.0169 0.0184 0.0101
(0.66) (0.12) (1.18) (1.02)
5 0.0122 0.0191* 0.0149* 0.0139
(0.48) (1.27) (1.41) (1.18)
2 1 0.0282 0.0555*** 0.0294** 0.0181 
(0.83) (2.34) (1.88) (1.10)
2 –0.0123 0.0072 0.0049 0.0024
(–0.37) (0.30) (0.37) (0.17)
3 0.0083 0.0197 0.0212 0.0060
(0.19) (0.60) (1.22) (0.31)
4 –0.0680*** 0.0131 –0.0177* –0.0329***
(–2.11) (0.64) (–1.30) (–2.30)
5 0.0241 0.0127 0.0115 0.0103
(0.77) (0.63) (0.84) (0.72)
3 1 0.0136 0.0512* 0.0351** 0.0192
(0.28) (1.51) (1.77) (0.88)
2 –0.0201 0.0109 0.0169 0.0303**
(–0.46) (0.37) (1.05) (1.75)
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through various risk-adjusted measures.
Table  11  reports  the  additional  test  in  which  alternative  risk
measures is considered to build RS groups. Panels A and B indicate that
taking  more  systematic  risk  might  not  positively  contribute  to  the
average fund performance. For example, the return gap between the
TABLE 10. (Continued)
B.
  Raw returns CAPM alphas FF alphas Carhart alphas 
 RS Size W–L W–L W–L W–L
  3 0.0506* 0.0361* 0.0388*** 0.0372***
(1.55) (1.56) (2.82) (2.56)
4 0.0658** –0.0051 0.0385*** 0.0339**
(1.91) (–0.25) (2.60) (2.19)
5 0.0034 0.0228 0.0368*** 0.0312***
(0.11) (1.22) (2.95) (2.33)
4 1 0.0218 0.0256 0.0278* 0.0046
(0.60) (0.92) (1.50) (0.24)
2 0.0345 –0.0205 0.0234* 0.0223
(0.87) (–0.77) (1.30) (1.21)
3 0.0010 0.0413** 0.0131 0.0148
(0.03) (1.70) (0.77) (0.81)
4 –0.0078 0.0173 0.0017 0.0007
(–0.19) (0.59) (0.09) (0.04)
5 0.0347* 0.0059 0.0086 0.0086
(1.33) (0.42) (0.75) (0.6890)
5 1 0.0306 0.0404** 0.0189 0.0073
(1.07) (1.83) (0.36) (0.0913)
2 –0.0169 –0.0316* 0.0150* 0.0173*
(–0.56) (–1.53) (1.30) (1.4169)
3 –0.0151 0.0043 0.0220** 0.0105
(–0.54) (0.24) (1.89) (0.8372)
4 –0.0585*** 0.0226* 0.0206*** 0.0283***
(–2.43) (1.62) (3.02) (2.6056)
5 –0.0236 0.0282*** 0.0143*** 0.0164***
(–0.82) (2.46) (2.26) (1.7734)
Note:  This table presents the mean performance of fund families subsequent to risk
shifting. In Column 1, families are ranked in ascending order to form 5 groups on the basis
of the magnitude of risk shifting. Funds are further sorted into groups by their end of year
size, in which winners losers are classified according to their half-year performance. Panel
A B reports the results based on segment family ranks. The differences between the winner
and loser groups are presented for each type of performance evaluation, with t statistics in
brackets. All results reported are in percentage values. ***, ** and * indicate significance at
the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 75 Fund Family Tournament and Performance Consequences
winner and loser group is 3.88% in the 1
st RS group but decreases to
–2.47%  when  funds  increases  their  market  beta.  The  performance
difference in terms of the Carhart alphas also decreases from 2% to
–0.93%. Similar results can be found in Panel B. Results in reported in
table 11 agrees with the our findings in the performance attribution
analysis in which the difference on the market beta between the winning
and losing groups is not statistically significant. It is therefore argued
that the performance improvement found in the family tournament in the
previous analysis cannot be attributed to the increased exposure to
systematic risk, although a positive relation is documented in previous
analysis, suggesting that winning funds tend to increase their market
beta in the second half of the year. As mentioned before, an increase in
the systematic risk is an indication of the enlargement of the holdings
of high beta stocks. Despite the efforts of winning managers to shift
portfolio composition to absorb more highly valued equities, mean
reversion of the returns of these stocks can demote winners’ leading
positions.
Results in Panels C and D do not show a clear pattern in the relation
between performance consequences and the level of change in the
idiosyncratic risks. This finding also confirms the previous results,
whereby  no  significant  changes  in  idiosyncratic  risk  take  place i n
response to funds’ family ranks.
Previous  literature  suggests  that  fund  families  may  increase
cross-sectional volatility of funds returns to increase the probability of
creating star funds. Given the spillover effects of fund flows and the
disproportionate  response  of  cash  inflows  to  funds’  historical
performance, fund families have incentives to encourage risk taking in
family  tournaments.  This  requires  us  to  further  examine  the
performance consequences with respect to the efforts by the fund family
to promote risk taking.
Table 12 documents a strong relation between the performance
improvement and the increase in cross-sectional risks within the fund
family. Specifically, dog families are found to significantly increase
their cross-sectional total risks to improve performance ranking of their
underlying funds. For example, the coefficients on   are 4.174, , it D o g D
 
2.391, 4.005 and 3.225 when fund performance is estimated by the mean
returns, CAPM alphas, FF alphas and Carhart alphas, respectively. All
of them are significant and the performance consequences respond
positively.  These  results  suggest  that  families  with  extremely
underperforming funds are strongly motivated to promote risk taking ofMultinational Finance Journal 76
TABLE 11. Post-ranking risk characteristics
A.
Raw returns Carhart alphas
Beta RS Winner Loser W–L Winner Loser W–L 
      1 0.0531 0.0143 0.0388*** 0.0587 0.0386 0.0200***
(3.19) (3.11)
      2 0.0328 0.0221 0.0107 0.0430 0.0433 –0.0003
(0.61) (–0.03)
      3 0.0496 0.0096 0.0400*** 0.0514 0.0412 0.0102*
(2.46) (1.47)
      4 0.0177 0.0314 –0.0231 0.0442 0.0409 0.0033
(–0.85) (0.47)
      5 0.0100 0.0348 –0.0247** 0.0373 0.0466 –0.0093*
(–1.94) (–1.62)
B.
Raw returns Carhart alphas
      1 0.0589 0.0183 0.0407*** 0.0499 0.0490 0.0009
(3.39) (0.13)
      2 0.0406 0.0124 0.0281*** 0.0498 0.0384 0.0114*
(1.71) (1.42)
      3 0.0265 0.0287 –0.0022 0.0463 0.0413 0.0050
(–0.14) (0.66)
      4 0.0363 0.0249 0.0114 0.0052 0.0510 0.0006
(0.76) (0.07)
      5 0.0112 0.0474 –0.0362*** 0.0449 0.0414 0.0035
(–2.97) (0.58)
C.
Raw returns Carhart alphas
Idio RS
     1 0.0210 0.0257 –0.0047 0.0428 0.0394 0.0035
(–0.37) (0.57)
     2 0.0480 0.0130 0.0350** 0.0373 0.0472 –0.0010
(2.05) (–1.16)
     3 0.0250 0.0267 –0.0017 0.0454 0.0412 0.0042
(–0.10) (0.65)
     4 0.0251 0.0169 0.0082 0.0462 0.0363 0.0099*
(0.51) (1.41)
     5 0.0287 0.0149 0.0138 0.0486 0.0437 0.0049
(1.10) (0.78)
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their underlying funds. Moreover, the results also find some evidence
to support a close relation between the increase of cross-sectional
idiosyncratic risks and the probability of funds in the dog families being
promoted, i.e.   has a coefficient equal to 1.189 when mean , it D o g D
  
returns are considered for ranking, and this increases to 1.264 and 1.260
when FF alphas or Carhart alphas are used. Dog families contain funds
that are ranked in the bottom 10% of the segment and none of their
members  have  top  performance.  Therefore,  they  are  motivated  to
undertake various strategies to create stars. Despite this, the results in
table 12 imply that dog families improve performance of a certain
member by sacrificing the profits of others. In addition to funds’ total
risk, changes in cross-sectional idiosyncratic risk can also be a channel
to improve performance. Thus, fund families may increase industrial
concentration  in  the  holdings  of  a  certain  fund  and  diversify  the
holdings of others to bet on the market. 
However, we find only weak evidence to suggest such a strategy in
TABLE 11. (Continued)
D.
Raw returns Carhart alphas
Idio RS Winner Loser W–L Winner Loser W–L 
      1 0.0269 0.0271 –0.0003 0.0398 0.0451 –0.0052
(–0.02) (–0.82)
      2 0.0338 0.0243 0.0094 0.0386 0.0532 –0.0146**
(0.59) (–1.63)
      3 0.0273 0.0278 –0.0005 0.0416 0.0451 –0.0036
(–0.03) (–0.52)
      4 0.0267 0.0269 –0.0002 0.0579 0.0299 0.0280***
(–0.01) (3.83)
      5 0.0347 0.0144 0.0203*** 0.0516 0.0451 0.0066
(1.70) (1.00)
Note:  This table presents the fund performance subsequent to risk shifting in terms of
the systematic and the idiosyncratic risks. In Column 1, funds are ranked in ascending order
to form 5 groups according to the magnitude of risk shifting. Panels A and B C and D report
the results based on sorting by systematic risk idiosyncratic risk on a 6–6 and 7–5 basis,
respectively. Funds are further sorted into the winner loser group if their performance is
higher lower than the median performance of the family. The subsequent fund performance
is calculated for each of the risk shifting groups and the corresponding winner and loser
groups. The differences between the winner and loser groups are presented for each type of
performance evaluation, with t statistics in brackets. All results reported are in percentage
values.  ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. Multinational Finance Journal 78
the star families. For example, the coefficients on   are in , it S t a r D
  
lower values, equalling to 1.351 when raw returns are used and 1.321
when Carhart alphas are used for measurement of the performance, and
only significant at the 10% significance level. It is plausible that the star
funds are already rewarded with increased cash inflows, which can also
benefit other peer funds for their performance enhancement. 
Table 12 also shows a significant relation between performance
TABLE 12. Aggregated family ranks analysis
   Odds ratio Raw returns CAPM alphas FF alphas Carhart alphas 
0.5822** 0.8431** 0.7888** 0.6330* , it R
 
(–2.01) (–2.14) (–2.33) (–1.72) 
1.3513* 1.3000* 1.4059* 1.3211*  , it S t a r D
  
(1.64) (1.61) (1.72) (1.61) 
4.1741*** 2.3911** 4.0054*** 3.2246** , it D o g D
  
(3.08) (2.01) (2.94) (2.52)
0.8543 0.9465 0.8277 0.8465 ,, i t Star Dog D
  
(–0.91) (–0.32) (–1.04) (–0.92)
1.0000 0.9999 0.9999 0.9999 , it S t a r D
  
(–0.06) (–0.54) (–0.70) (–0.82)
0.9999 0.9999 1.0000 0.9999 , it D o g D
  
(–1.18) (–0.72) (–0.40) (–0.53)
1.0000 1.0008 1.0000 1.0000 ,, i t Star Dog D
  
(0.87) (0.67) (0.17) (0.43)
1.0025 0.9859 0.9979 1.0208 , it S t a r D
  
(0.04) (–0.21) (–0.02) (0.28)
1.1893* 1.1851* 1.2643*** 1.2100** , it D o g D
  
(1.89) (1.86) (2.64) (2.20)
0.9145 0.9433 0.9844 0.9911 ,, i t Star Dog D
  
(–1.21) (–0.85) (–0.24) (–0.13)
 χ
2 26.90 14.61 25.29 21.22 
Obs. 534 534 534 534
Note:  This table presents the odds ratios from the post-ranking performance analysis of
model 2. Fund families are ranked according to performance changes of the underlying
members. Fund performance is estimated by four evaluation measures: the raw total returns,
the CAPM alphas, the Fama French alphas and the Carhart alphas. ,    a n d   , it
  , it
  , it
  
are the cross sectional risk difference on funds’ total risk, the systematic risk and the
idiosyncratic risk between the ranking and post-ranking period, respectively.   is the , it R
 
family rank that measures the level of risk shifting for individual funds within the family.DStar
DDog is equal to 10 when the family is a star dog family. DStar,Dog is equal to 1 if the family has
both star and dog funds and 0 otherwise. The model is fitted by the ordinal logistic model.
The z statistics are shown in brackets. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and
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improvement  and  the  shifting  funds’  idiosyncratic  risk,  which  is
consistent with previous results. But it seems to have lesser power in
explaining  the  aggregated  rank  promotion  compared  with  the
contribution made by the changes in cross-sectional risk. Moreover, no
conclusive evidence can be found that shifting of the systematic risk
exposure is related to the increases in the aggregate performance ranks.
D. Cross-fund subsidization in family tournament
In this section, we examine the fund family’s strategy of cross-fund
subsidization. The above research documents that mid-year winners
outperform the losers in the risk-adjusted returns by increasing their risk
exposure, but the situation reverses when it turns to observed returns.
The results argue that it might be due to managers’ intention to signal
the fund family about their superior skills in order to gain additional
resource  from  the  fund  family.  Gaspar  et  al.  (2006)  suggests  an
empirical  method  to  test  the  strategy  of  family’s  cross-fund
subsidization which can be considered as the major channel for the
family  to  promote  their  favourite  funds.  To  address  the  concerns
regarding to the family favouritism as the reward of higher risk-adjusted
returns, we modify their method to rank funds according to their Carhart
alphas for each month. Funds ranked above the 25
th and 75
th percentile
are formed as the Low and High value group, respectively. Two sets of
High/Low value pairs are then constructed. In the actual pair, each of
the funds in the High value group is matched with a fund within the
same family but in the Low value group. In the second set of the
High/Low value pairs, the matching pairs, each of the low value funds
in the actual pairs is replaced by a random selected fund within the same
ranking percentile as the original low value fund but from a different
fund family. The return differences between the High and Low value
funds for each pair then act as the dependant variable. The empirical
model can be shown as following:
(5)
(1) (2)
,, , , ,
HL F a m i l y S t y l e
it it i i it i it it RR D D       
where   and   are the dummy variables that takes the value ,
Family
it D ,
Style
it D
of 1 when funds within the pair belong to the same family or the same
investment style, respectively. If the family does subsidise the mangers
with superior skill, we expect that the same-family dummy is positivelyMultinational Finance Journal 80
TABLE 13. Cross-fund subsidization
A. 1
st half year
Intercept D
Family D
Style
Coeff. 0.1027*** –0.0325*** 0.0438***
t-Stat. (22.62) (–6.01) (7.85)
Adjusted R
2 0.16
B. 2
nd half year
Intercept D
Family D
Style  
Coeff. 0.0082*** 0.0082** –0.0090**
t-Stat. (2.20) (1.99) (–2.00)
Adjusted R
2 0.09 
C.  Monthly
Intercept D
Family D
Style 
Feb. 0.1137*** –0.0170* 0.0515***
(14.85) (–1.87) (5.58)
Mar. 0.1721*** –0.1437*** 0.0279*
(15.67) (–10.57) (1.93)
Apr. 0.0405*** –0.0184 0.0520***
(3.41) (–1.29) (3.52)
May 0.0621*** 0.0341*** 0.0450***
(9.94) (4.69) (6.05)
Jun. 0.0068 0.0557*** –0.0270***
(0.97) (6.84) (–3.27)
Jul. –0.1491*** 0.1536*** –0.0462***
(–16.30) (13.78) (–4.04)
Aug. –0.0749*** –0.0161 0.0215**
(–9.94) (–1.74) (2.26)
Sep. 0.2225*** –0.2045*** 0.0224*
(19.29) (–15.23) (1.64)
Oct. –0.0140* 0.0315*** 0.0230**
(–1.78) (3.29) (2.31)
Nov. –0.0184** 0.0268*** –0.0359***
(–2.52) (3.29) (–4.40)
Dec. 0.0137* 0.0368*** 0.0107
  (1.64) (3.61) (0.98) 
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related with the return differences. 
The results from Eq(5) are reported in table 13. It is suggested that
fund family conduct significant cross-fund subsidization by shifting
performance  from  high  alpha  funds  to  low  alpha  funds  after  the
mid-year. For example, in Panel A the coefficient of the family dummy
suggests that the return difference between the High/Low value funds
of the same family is on average 0.82% higher than funds in matching
pairs. However, opposite results are found when turning to the first half
of the year in Panel A. In Panel C we further examine the cross-fund
subsidization on a monthly basis. The results suggest that the family
subsidization is more pronounced in the second half of the year when
most of the coefficients of the same-family dummy is positive and
significant from 0.
The above findings support the view regarding the motivation of
mangers’ risk taking in the family tournament. Specifically, funds with
high  risk-adjusted  returns  gain  benefits  through  the  cross-fund
subsidization which can drive managers’ intention of active trading. The
results also indicate that the fund family consider mangers’ skill as the
major criteria in judging which fund to be promoted.
TABLE 13. (Continued)
Note:  This table presents the regression results from the test of cross-fund subsidization.
For each month, we rank all the funds in ascending orders according to their Carhart alphas,
and funds within the 25
th percentile 75
th percentile are formed to be the Low High value fund
groups. The comparison peer group is all the funds in the same style. We then construct two
sets of High/Low value pairs, namely, the actual pair and the matching pair. In the actual pair,
each of the funds in the High value group is matched with a fund of the same family but in
the Low value group. In the matching pair, each of the Low value funds in the actual pair is
substituted with a fund taken from the same ranking percentile but within a different fund
family. The return difference is then computed in the month following the ranking month.  
is the dummy variable which equals to 1 when the paired funds are in the same fund family. 
 is the same style dummy that takes a value of 1 when the paired funds are within the same
investment style. Panel A reports the results when we only consider the subsidization in the
first half of the year while Panel B reports the results from the second half of the year. In
Panel C we report the results from the monthly regression. Funds’ daily returns from 3 UK
IMA segments, UK All Companies, UK Equity Income and UK Small Companies, are
examined for the sample years between 2001 and 2010. ***, ** and * indicate significance
at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.Multinational Finance Journal 82
VI.  Conclusions
This  research  analyses  the  risk  taking  behaviour  in  fund  family
tournaments, and the performance consequences. Using the data from
UK  unit  trusts,  our  research  documents  a  significant  risk  taking
behaviour in the family tournaments. The half-year winning funds in the
family are likely to take more risks than their peers in the same family.
On the other hand, winning managers would consider adopting similar
risk  taking  strategies  as  the  losers,  since  they  have  competitive
advantages over the losers, such as more capital injection and family
favouritism. This paper also analyses that how risk shifting is related to
different incentive. By classifying the sampled years into bear and bull
market condition, the results suggest a positive relation better risk taking
and previous performance in the bear market when mid-year losers are
more concerned about their jobs rather than compensation. And such a
correlation is more pronounced than the situation in bull market when
compensation incentive is dominant.
The results from the performance consequences of risk shifting show
a  strong  relation  between  risk  taking  and  performance  changes.
Regarding to the observed returns, they are consistent with the previous
research in which increasing risk is accompanied with performance
drop. But when turning to the risk-adjusted performance, risk shifting
is positively correlated to funds’ performance. Given that the half-year
winners will increase their taking of systematic risk, the deterioration in
funds’ observed returns seems due to the mean reversion of high value
equities  in  portfolio  holdings.  When  risk-adjusted  performance  is
considered,  the  winning  funds  outperform  the  losing  ones  in  the
post-ranking period. It is argued this is due to managers’ intention to
show off their skills in order to gain further subsidization from the fund
family. The empirical results from the test of families’ cross-fund
subsidization support this view. In addition, no evidence is found that
the increasing of the systematic risk or the idiosyncratic risk can lead to
a strong performance improvement.
The  analysis  shows  that  the  families  that  have  extremely  poor
performing funds in their groups would manage to promote segment
ranks of most of their underlying funds by increasing the cross-sectional
volatility in both total and idiosyncratic risks. This implies that the fund
family may sacrifice the profits of certain members to benefit the others,
given the disproportionate responses in cash inflows and the spillover
effect. This research thus provides empirical evidence on effects of83 Fund Family Tournament and Performance Consequences
family  tournaments  and  performance  shifting.  In  general,  we  find
significant  results  to  support  the  notion  that  risk  taking  in  family
tournaments can be viewed as an indication of managers’ superior
ability.
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